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Reasons for Regional Integration 
Agreements 
Regional integration agreements are commonplace in the world today. In 1996 there 
were 88 such agreements worldwide, covering a variety of forms from declarations of 
intent to unilateral preferential trade agreements, free trade treaties, customs unions, and 
the common market with its freedom of movement for labour and capital. Which factors 
have contributed to the great popularity of regional integration agreements? 
I n regional integration agreements (RIAs), partner countries agree to dismantle trade barriers on a 
reciprocal basis while barriers to imports from other 
countries remain fundamentally unchanged. In 1996, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) counted 88 RIAs 
currently in operation. RIAs cover declarations of 
intent (APEC), preferential trade agreements, free 
trade treaties (EEA, EFTA, NAFTA), customs unions 
(MERCOSUR, CARICOM) to the common market with 
its freedom of movement for labour and capital (EU)o 
Regional forms of integration are widespread, and all 
the member nations of the WTO are currently party to 
at least one such agreement. Intraregional trade 
currently accounts for approximately half of world 
trade. In western Europe - the region where regional 
integration is most advanced - regional trade's share 
of total trade has risen from around 50% in the 1950s 
to about 70%. 1 
Which reasons contribute to the popularity of RIAs? 
The foremost reason is that RIAs are expected to have 
positive welfare effects arising from improved allo- 
cation. However, RIAs are not only popular as a result 
of their expected welfare effects, but can also be 
politically attractive because of their potential effects 
on distribution. 
Welfare Effects 
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the various mecha- 
nisms by which RIAs achieve welfare effects. Firstly, 
RIAs influence the allocation of resources between 
particular industries within the area of integration and 
possibly also in the rest of the world. Secondly, 
integration has consequences for the spatial distri- 
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bution of economic activities within the area of inte- 
gration and, finally, integration can be accompanied 
by temporary or permanent growth effects. The 
following remarks concentrate on static allocation 
effects. 2 
Perfect Competition 
A mutual reduction of tariffs or other trade barriers 
with economic rents which accrue domestically leads 
to the well-known trade-creating and trade-diverting 
effects. This distinction, which was introduced by 
Viner, 3 is based on the fact that tariff reductions in the 
partner countries (let us say A and B) lead to lower 
prices for imports from the partner country and thus 
to an increase in the consumption of these goods and 
a fall in domestic production. Trade expands. On the 
other hand it is possible that, due to the tariff 
discrimination against imports from the rest of the 
world (C), lower-cost goods from C are replaced by 
goods imported from the respective partner country. 
Although the goods from the respective partner 
country are produced at higher cost, customs 
exemption makes them cheaper for domestic 
consumers than the goods from country C. The 
partner country affected loses out as a result of this 
diversion of trade, because if it were possible for 
everybody in that country to undertake to purchase 
the product from country C despite the higher price, 
to pay the tariffs and then to refund the duty to 
themselves, the product would be cheaper on a net 
basis than the duty-free good from the partner 
WTO: Annual Report 1996. 
2 For athorough survey see R. E. Ba ldwin ,  A. J. Venab les :  
Regional Economic Integration, inr G. Grossman,  K. Rogof f  
(eds.): Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, Amsterdam 
1995, pp. 1597-1644. 
J. V iner :  The Customs Union Issue, New York 1950. 
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Figure 1 
Effects of Regional Integration Agreements 
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country? Because of the possibility of trade diversion, 
so-called "small countries" should always give 
preference to unilateral liberalisation rather than 
membership of an RIA. 
The arguments become more sophisticated if 
changes in the terms of trade are taken into 
consideration. Any change in the internal exchange 
relationship between the partner countries will favour 
one country and disadvantage the other; however, 
these effects cancel each other out. On the other 
hand, the partner countries' increased strength of 
demand and supply, along with the diversion of trade, 
leads to an improvement in their external terms of 
trade. As Ohyama 5 and Kemp/Wan 8 have demon- 
strated in the case of a customs union with common 
external tariffs, it is always possible to raise the 
common welfare of the partner countries if the 
external tariff rate is adjusted accordingly. If the 
"compensatory tariff rate" is chosen, a term which 
was introduced by Vanek 7 and which leaves the 
volume of trade with country C unchanged, and if 
country C does not alter its trade policy, 8 then the 
customs union represents a Pareto improvement for 
the whole world. Country C does not lose out and the 
common welfare of the partner countries increases as 
4 A. L. H i l lm an: Resolving the Puzzle of Welfare Reducing Trade 
Diversion: A Prisoner's Dilemma Interpretation, in: Oxford Economic 
Papers, Vol. 41 (1989), pp. 452-455. 
5 M. Ohyama:  Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium, in: Keio 
Economic Studies, Vol. 9 (1972), pp. 37-73. 
6 M. Kemp,  H. Y. Wan: An Elementary Proposition Concerning 
the Formation of Customs Unions, in: Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 6 (1976), pp. 95-97. 
J. Vanek  : General Equilibrium of International Discrimination: The 
Case of Customs Unions, Cambridge 1965. 
8 M. R ichardson:  On the Interpretation of the Kemp/Wan 
Theorem, in: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 47 (1995), pp. 696-703. 
there is free trade between them. However, compen- 
sation payments may be necessary between the 
partner countries. 
The third mechansim in competitive markets is the 
trade cost effect. Baldwin/Venables ~use this term to 
describe the removal of trade barriers which do not 
involve a domestic rent. This is the case, for example, 
when different regulations in the respective countries 
lead to higher production costs or when the rent 
accrues abroad (e.g. in the case of voluntary export 
restraints). Dismantling trade barriers of this sort by 
means of an RIA is always advantageous, even for a 
small country. In a situation of this sort, trade 
diversion has a positive effect, because the country 
does not lose rents in the form of customs revenues, 
but saves real costs. 
Imperfect Competition 
A number of RIAs link industrialised countries with 
a high proportion of intra-industrial trade. Their 
markets are usually characterised by heterogenous 
products, increasing returns to scale and strategic 
interaction between suppliers. Given market forms of 
this kind, RIAs can shift the volume of production and 
influence the intensity of competition within an 
industry. 1~ 
A shift in production is characterised by the fact 
that while production within the member countries A 
and B rises, it falls elsewhere (country C). This effect 
can be illustrated using the example of a market with 
monopolistic competition. Each company produces 
its own variant of a particular good. Integration bet- 
ween A and B reduces the trade costs for companies 
located in A or B, thus giving these companies a price 
advantage which leads to an increase in market share 
and to positive profits. Conversely, companies in 
country C suffer a decline in sales revenues and 
profits since by assumption they do not benefit from 
the regional liberalisation. If market access and 
withdrawal is admitted, then the number of 
companies within the member countries increases 
while that in country C falls. In this market form, 
welfare effects arise not only as a result of the 
9 R.E. Ba ldwin ,  A.J. Venab les ,  op. cit. 
,0 W. Eth ier ,  H. Horn :  A New Look at Economic Integration, in: 
H. K ie rszkowsk i  (ed.): Monopolistic Competition and 
International Trade, Oxford 1984; A. J Ve n a b I e s : Customs Union, 
Tariff Reform and Imperfect Competition, in: European Economic 
Review, Vol. 31 (1987), pp. 103-110; A. J. Venab les :  The Eco- 
nomic Integration in Oligopolistic Markets, in: European Economic 
Review, Vol. 34 (1990), pp 753-769; J. Haa land ,  I. Wooton:  
Market Integration, Competition and Welfare, in: L. A. Winters  
(ed.): Trade Flow and Trade Policy After "1992", Cambridge 1992. 
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increase in trade volume, but also because of 
changes in the variety of products available. Since a 
greater variety of products is now produced within the 
partner countries themselves - and trade costs are 
thus avoided - the consumer prices for these goods 
within the integration area fall. Welfare in countries A 
and B increases. Country C on the other hand now 
produces less variety of goods and imports more. 
Since imports involve trade costs, consumer prices in 
country C rise and welfare declines. 
RIAs can also alter the strategic interaction bet- 
ween companies and so influence profit surcharges 
as well as the optimal size of a firm. Effects on com- 
petition such as these can have a variety of sources. 
Firstly, regional trade liberalisation can reduce the 
dispersion of the market shares held by individual 
companies: companies within the integration area 
lose domestic market share and gain market share in 
the partner country. This intensifies competition and 
so lowers prices and reduces company profits. In the 
case of free market access and withdrawal, the 
number of firms will fall and the remaining firms will 
increase their production. If there are increasing 
returns to scale, then the RIA will lead to their being 
better utilised. Consequently, additional welfare 
effects arise from the reduction of average costs and 
thus lower prices. Secondly, a pro-competitive ffect 
can arise from the fact that an RIA can completely 
eliminate market segmentation. Price differentiation is 
then no longer possible. 
Regional vs. Unilateral or 
Multilateral LiberaUsation 
The above observations on welfare effects demon- 
strate welfare improvements compared to a situation 
with trade barriers. The only negative effect is the 
diversion of trade, and this can be reduced by suitable 
design of external tariffs. The advantages of an RIA 
compared to a unilateral liberalisation of trade lie in 
the development of the terms of trade, in the possible 
shift of production, in the larger fall in prices together 
" A. L. H i l lman,  IR Moser :  Trade Liberalization as Politically 
Optimal Exchange of Market Access, in: M. Canzoner i ,  W. Et- 
hier, V. Gr i l l i  (eds.): The New Transatlantic Economy, Cambridge 
1996, pp. 295-312. 
~2 p. Wonnacot t ,  R J .  Wonnacot t :  Is Unilateral Tariff Reduc- 
tion Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing 
Foreign Tariffs, in: American Economic Review, VoL 71 {1981), 
pp. 704-714. 
~ P. K r u g m a n : The Move to Free Trade Zones, in: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City Review, Vol. 76 (1991), pp. 5-25; J. A. F r a n k e I, 
E. S te in ,  S-J. Wie: Regional Trading Arrangements: Natural or 
Supernatural?, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 86 (1996), No. 2, 
pp.52-56. 
with more product variety, and in the greater reduction 
of production costs. The question remains as to why 
regional liberalisation should be preferred to multi- 
lateral removal of trade barriers. A variety of argu- 
ments come into play here, including the fact that 
multilateral iberalisation is often only possible on the 
basis of the lowest common denominator? 1 This is 
likely to be particularly important when it comes to 
dismantling the non-tariff trade barriers which are 
often key areas of RIAs. Thus a harmonisation or 
mutual acceptance of product standards and market 
access regulations between countries with similar 
levels of protection is easier than between countries 
with large discrepancies in their regulatory traditions. 
Additionally, the mutual advantages of trade liberali- 
sation are especially great if, due to transport cost 
advantages, reciprocal market access is particularly 
beneficial. ~2 Finally, there is the chance that, via the 
RIA, partner countries can gain advantages at the 
cost of non-participating countries, for example by 
exploiting their increased market power? 3 
Distributional Effects 
Distributional effects influence political practicabi- 
lity whenever certain people or groups of people 
exercise different degrees of influence on the political 
decision-making process. If distributional effects are 
small, for example, then general welfare effects 
dominate political decisions. For instance, few 
distributional effects are to be expected from the 
liberalisation of intra-industrial trade, since structural 
adjustments take place largely within a particular 
industry?' In this case it is not only the consumers in 
the member countries who benefit from a greater 
variety of lower priced products, but at the same time 
most manufacturers can increase their profits thanks 
to additional exports. However, distributional effects 
can also ease political practicability in that, in the case 
of reciprocal trade diversion, export companies can 
participate from higher prices in the other partner 
country 1' or, where rules of origin privide protection for 
the manufacturers of intermediate products in the 
partner countries? 6 
14 See also the empirical study by H. P. Marve l ,  E.J. Ray: Intra- 
industry Trade: Sources and Effects on Protection, in: Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 95 (1987), pp.1278-1291. 
I ,G .M Grossman,  E. He lpman:  The Politics of Free Trade 
Agreements, in: American Eoonom{~ Review, Vo(. 85, No. 4 (1995), 
pp. 667-690. 
1, A. O. K r u g e r: Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: 
Rules of Origin, National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper No. 4352, 1993. 
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Reciprocal Trade Diversion 
Reciprocal trade diversion caused by an RIA can 
be politically advantageous if export companies can 
benefit from higher prices in the partner country and 
thus achieve an economic rent. In addition, import 
protection for protected producers in the partner 
country declines less than if they were faced by 
competition from the cheapest suppliers in the case 
of unilateral tariff cuts. Fig. 2 clearly demonstrates this 
point. Country A and country B conclude a free trade 
agreement whereby each country retains its own tariff 
rate (t A, t B) on imports from the rest of the world 
(country C). M A represents import demand for a good 
in country A, and S g describes the total supply curve 
in country B. In case (1), country B has relatively few 
of the production factors required to manufacture this 
good, such that supply in B is not sufficient to cover 
country A's total import demand at the price pA Since 
the price in country A is higher than in B, companies 
in country B export their entire production to country 
A. Consequently, consumers in country B cover their 
requirements with imports from the rest of the world. 
What are distributive consequences between A and B 
as a result of the RIA? There are no advantages or 
disadvantages for consumers in either of the two 
countries since consumer prices in A and B remain 
unchanged. Manufacturers in country B, on the other 
hand, receive a higher rent as they can share in the 
advantages of the higher tariff rate in country A. The 
level of protection for manufacturers in country A 
remains unchanged. Since there are benefits for 
manufacturers in B without those in A suffering any 
losses, Grossman/Helpman describe this case as 
extended protection. Welfare in country A falls 
because the country loses customs revenue (to the 
extent of the areas D+E+H+I+K in Fig. 2): only trade 
diversion takes place. Welfare in country B increases 
due to the additional producer's surplus (area D) and 
the rise in customs revenue (H+I), since home- 
Figure 2 
Effects of Trade Diversion 
Price 
sB(t) 
pA=pC(1 +t A) . . . . . . . . . . .  
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produced goods previously sold in B are now 
exported to A and are replaced by imports from C. 
The loss of welfare in A is greater than the welfare gain 
in B to the extent of the area E+K, reflecting the global 
loss of efficiency caused by trade diversion. 
In case (2) on the other hand, protection is reduced 
as a result of the RIA. In B, the supply from the 
companies is so large that country A imports exclu- 
sively from B and the price in A falls to the same level 
as that in B. The producer's surplus in A dwindles 
while there is no advantage to manufacturers in B 
because they cannot achieve a higher price in A and 
because they continue to sell part of their production 
in their own country. Beneficiaries are the consumers 
in A. Customs revenues in A dry up while those in 
country B increase since B imports more from the rest 
of the world. Welfare in A increases if the profits from 
trade creation (area G) are greater than the costs of 
trade diversion (H+I+K+L). On the other hand, welfare 
in B rises as a result of the higher customs revenues 
(H+I+K+L+M) since, for domestic consumption, the 
products exported to Country A are replaced by 
imports from the rest of the world. In this case, 
diversion of trade does not go hand in hand with an 
increase in production in B, and for this reason there 
is a rise in the common welfare of both countries 
(G+M). 
Comparison of the two cases demonstrates the 
following: if political decision-makers are aiming to 
achieve the highest possible level of welfare, then 
they should only conclude RIAs which involve a 
reduction in protection (case 2). If, however, greater 
weight is given to manufacturers' rather than 
consumers' interests - and a number of theoretical 
arguments and empirical studies support this 
supposition ~7 - then a certain degree of reciprocal 
trade diversion in combination with greater protection 
is politically advantageous. This is because export 
companies in both partner countries benefit from this 
solution, and the losses of rents suffered by 
producers who have to compete with imports are 
smaller than in the case of regional integration with 
reduced protection (and also, of course, smaller than 
in the case of unilateral or multilateral iberalisation). 
Protection Through Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin determine from which country a 
product originates. This is necessary in all forms of 
'~ See the summaries in A. L. H i l lman:  The Political Economy of 
Protection, Chur 1989, and D. R o d r i k : Political Economy of Trade 
Protection, in: G. Grossman,  K. Rogof f  (eds.): Handbook of 
International Economics, Vol. Ill, Amsterdam 1995, pp, 1457-1494. 
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RIAs - with the exception of customs unions - in 
order to prevent products from third countries being 
imported into the partner country which applies the 
lowest of external tariff rate. Rules of origin are 
extremely complex and comprehensive. The rules of 
origin contained in the interim agreement between the 
European Union and Poland, for example, take up 
more than 60 pages. Two rules of origin commonly 
applied are the following: (1) Goods production within 
a particular country must be designed in such as way 
as that the final product falls under a different tariff 
heading than the intermediate products imported 
from other countries. (2) A certain proportion of value 
added (e.g. 40%) must be created in the country itself. 
The costs of documenting the origin of products 
represent considerable trade costs. Herin, TM for 
example, demonstrates that in 1984 a quarter of EFTA 
exports to the EU did without the relevant 
documentary evidence, thus forgoing the tariff 
exemption to which they were entitled by the free 
trade agreement between the EFTA countries and the 
EU. 
While there are certain disadvantages for producers 
of final products, there are also advantages for the 
producers of intermediate products. If, for example, a 
Polish manufacturer imported intermediate products 
from Lithuania before the free trade agreement with 
the EU, then that manufacturer may now be forced by 
the stipulated minimum level of value added (e.g. 
40%) to purchase these intermediate products from a 
supplier in the EU or in Poland. Together with the rules 
of origin, the free trade agreement can thus provide 
,8 j .  H e r i n : Rules of Origin and Differences between Tariff Levels in 
EFTA and the EC, EFTA Occasional Paper, No. 13, 1986. 
19 See for example the overview by h A. Winters :  The European 
Community: A Case of Successful Integration? in J. de Melo and 
A. Panagar iya  (eds.): New Dimensions in Regional Integration, 
Cambridge 1993, pp. 202-228, on the EU, and that of J. E Fran-  
co is ,  C. R. Sh ie l l s  (eds.): Modelling Trade Policy: Applied Gene- 
ral Equilibrium Asessment of North American Free Trade, Cambridge 
1994, on NAFTA. 
=o B. Ba lassa  (ed.): European Economic Integration, Amsterdam 
1975. 
2~ p. R o b s o n : The Economics of International Integration, London 
1984. 
22 L. A. Winters :  Britain in Europe: A Survey of Quantitative Trade 
Studies, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 25 (1987), 
pp. 315-335. 
23 A. M. E I -Agraa :  The Theory and Measurement of International 
Economic Integration, New York 1989. 
2, R. Pomfret :  Unequal Trade: The Economics of Discriminatory 
International Trade Policies, Oxford 1988. 
25 See the compilation in R. E. Ba ldwin ,  A.J. Venab les ,  op. cit. 
p.1632. 
25 R. E. Ba ldwin :  Towards an Integrated Europe, Centre for Eco- 
nomic Policy Research, London 1994. 
protection to manufacturers of intermediate products 
within the partner countries. This protectionist effect 
is mitigated if, when calculating the minimum value 
added, the value added in a certain country can be 
cumulated with that in countries with a similar trade 
policy status. 
Conclusions 
RIAs are politically attractive both as a result of the 
expected welfare effects and the potential distribu- 
tional effects. The weight given to the two arguments 
is an empirical issue. There is a wide range of 
empirical studies on the effects of both the EU and of 
NAFTA. 19 There is a consensus amongst EU re- 
searchers that while there has been considerable 
trade creation for industrial products, trade diversion 
has taken place in the case of agricultural goods. This 
is a direct result of the EU's divergent external trade 
policies in these two sectors. While external customs 
duties for industrial products were reduced in the 
course of free trade agreements and GAI-I, trade 
protection for agricultural products remains extremely 
high. Balassa, 2~ Robson 21 and Winters 22 consider the 
net effect of trade creation and trade diversion to be 
positive, while others such as EI-Agraa 23 and Pomfret 2' 
regard it as negative. If competitive effects are taken 
into consideration, there is evidence of additional 
welfare effects thanks to the greater utilisation of 
economies of scale. The extent of these additional 
effects is equal to around half a percent of gross 
domestic product 2s and is only significantly higher if 
possible accumulation effects resulting from capital 
stock adjustments are taken into consideration. 
These results imply that western European 
integration has indeed increased welfare levels in the 
countries involved, but that it has been accompanied 
by considerable diversion of trade and thus by 
distributional effects. This suggests that both argu- 
ments - welfare and distribution - are indeed of 
political importance when concluding an RIA. While 
the empirical studies on the ELI mentioned above 
have dealt with integration in western Europe, it 
should not be overlooked that the EU's policy of 
integration towards the countries of eastern and 
central Europe is taking place much more strongly on 
a bilateral basis. Baldwin 26 speaks of "hub and spoke" 
bilateralism, because trade liberalisation in the 
transformation economies is strongly focused on the 
hub of western Europe. This policy may induce a 
considerable degree of trade diversion and possibly 
also diversion of investment. While this may make 
RIAs in these countries politically more easy to realise, 
it reduces welfare benefits. 
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